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Active and passive investors and their impact on corporate governance. 
All over the world the different companies have a similar set of corporate 
governance problems. Everyone wants to improve the effectiveness of internal and 
external control mechanisms. The active and passive investors, obviously, have a great 
impact on corporate governance of each company.  
One of the external control mechanism is investor activism. How far can 
institutional investors bring about improved corporate governance in the companies in 
which they hold shares, and what impact does this intervention have on the 
performance of those companies? Nevertheless, we will attempt to understand the role 
of passive investor and what it, actually, leads to? To some changes in corporate 
governance and performance or to that passive investors simply tend to hold stocks? 
Academics are skeptical as to whether a scientific link can be proven between 
effective governance and performance [1], as the study of these effects is constrained 
by methodological issues. But some practitioners underline, that there is indeed a 
strong positive link between good corporate governance and firm performance. Thus, 
we have solid evidence, that improving and encouraging increased shareholder 
activism is on the legislative agenda. There are some forms of investor activism as 
organize a very costly proxy fight, which on average has a positive effect on the share 
price, voting campaigns and voting initiatives. In voting campaigns, investors vote 
against proposals by the management, while in voting initiatives investors put 
proposals of their own to the shareholders. The last one is the most common form of 
institutional activism [4].  
Today activists are more likely to push a company to accept an acquisition offer, 
34 
 
sell off certain parts of its business, or improve operations. That means they are helping 
to drive strategy. Research shows that activists apparently make companies more 
profitable and productive. And although their intervention may be followed by a 
decrease in research and development (R&D) expenditures, the companies appear to 
become more innovative in the years following. [2] 
At this point, let us turn our attention to the passive investors and the results of 
some researches. The passive investors affect firm governance in several ways. On the 
other hand, an increase in passive ownership is associated with a statistically significant 
increase in the share of independent directors on firms’ boards. In addition, firms with 
higher passive investor ownership were more likely to remove firm takeover defenses. 
The results point to that passive institutions influence firm governance primarily 
through the power of their voice. An increase in passive ownership is associated with 
a decline in support for management proposals and a boost in support for shareholder 
proposals. Basically, when passive funds make up a larger percentage of the ownership, 
management appears to be confronted with a more contentious shareholder base. 
There is evidence that passive investors are taking these actions with the belief 
that improved governance will eventually lead to improved performance and, 
ultimately, shareholder value. Surprisingly, but passive ownership is associated with 
higher profitability and firm value. 
The passive investors always try to choose own way in their actions. But, 
nevertheless, it is solid evidence that passive investors are improving firm performance 
by advocating for proven governance reforms that require a low level of costly 
monitoring on their part. While not active in the traditional sense, passive investors are 
not passive owners. Even without the power of exit they are leveraging the power of 
voice in their growing voting blocs to shape firms’ governance and policies. [3] 
Finally, we should put emphasizes on an important area for future research - rise 
of hedge funds. These are increasingly at the forefront of shareholder activism. Hedge 
funds have gone as far as launching their own hostile takeover bids. It may be that, by 
leading the charge, hedge funds will encourage many of the more traditional 
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Innovations in financial services 
The purpose of this thesis is to consider innovations in financial services. It is 
particularly concerned with exploration of the transformative potential of new entrants 
and innovations on business models in financial services. The group of experts from 
World Economic Forum set out three major problems that have prevented a 
comprehensive understanding of the state of disruptive innovation[1]:  
 There is no common taxonomy or understanding of which innovations are the 
most relevant;  
 There is no clear understanding of the evolutionary path of emerging 
innovations;  
